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IF THERE ARE NO DIACHRONIC NORMS OF
RATIONALITY, WHY DOES IT SEEM
LIKE THERE ARE?
Ryan Doody
Abstract: I offer an explanation for why certain sequences
of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I
argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet
plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of di-
achronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in
which you had the opportunity to hide something unflat-
tering and failed to do so.
1 Introduction
Suppose that you have a banana and I have an apple. You pay me a nickel
to trade your banana for my apple. Then you pay me another nickel to
trade back. You have the banana you started with and two fewer nickels.
It seems like you’ve behaved foolishly. It looks like you’ve done something
irrational.
Let’s say that you suffer diachronic misfortune when you perform a
sequence of actions resulting in an outcome that is worse, by your own
lights, than some other outcome that would’ve resulted had you performed
a different sequence of actions which was, in some sense, available to you.
Suffering misfortune is unfortunate, but not necessarily irrational. That
said, some cases of diachronic misfortune, like the example above, do strike
us as irrational. The main objective of this paper is to explain why.
The explanation goes like this. Being practically rational, at the very
least, involves being instrumentally rational: your preferences over actions
(or, “means”) should cohere with your goals (or, “ends”).1 Taking an action
that does a worse job of furthering your ends is instrumentally irrational. I
will argue that creatures like us—creatures who are deeply social—have, as
1 This is not to say that being practically rational is only a matter of being instrumentally
rational. It could be, for example, that certain ends are in themselves irrational irrespective of
your beliefs and desires. Or it could be that certain combinations of attitudes are ipso facto
irrational even if they don’t lead to failures of instrumental rationality. I won’t be taking a
stand on that issue in this paper, however. All I am claiming here is that practical rationality
requires instrumental rationality.
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a matter of practical necessity, come to internalize a standing desire to con-
struct flattering yet plausible autobiographical narratives about ourselves
and our behavior. Constructing these sorts of narratives are, as a matter
of psychological fact, important ends for creatures like us. Performing an
action that doesn’t serve this end as well as some other (when there are
no overriding considerations) isn’t instrumentally rational. And when you
perform a suboptimal sequence of the sort that strikes us as irrational, there
is some action that you’ve performed which didn’t best serve your goal of
constructing a flattering yet plausible autobiographical narrative.2
So, even if we are not rationally required to care about what we’ve done
in the past or will do in the future, we often do care about these things. We
care about what we’ve done and what we will do because we care about the
kinds of stories that can be plausibly told about our diachronic behavior.
And, furthermore, we can’t help but care about this; our social nature has
led us to internalize this desire, rendering it inescapable for creatures like us.
And so the purely synchronic rational requirement to choose the available
option that is prospectively best given everything you now care about gives
rise to what appears to be a diachronic norm,3 or so I will argue.
2 Time-Slice Rationality
There is a debate in decision theory and epistemology about whether or not
there are fundamental, irreducible diachronic requirements of rationality.4
2 Elsewhere (Doody Unpublished), I hypothesize that the cases in which we feel rational
pressure to honor sunk costs are those in which it will be easier to integrate the action which
honors sunk costs into a plausible autobiography according to which its protagonist has not
suffered diachronic misfortune. In these cases, there will be an asymmetry in the prospects of
spinning a plausible story that casts you in a good light; in the cases in which we don’t feel
pressure to honor our sunk costs, however, honoring sunk costs will make the prospects of
telling an exonerating story just as dire as they would be were you to not honor sunk costs.
The idea, which will be developed in more detail below, is that we have a standing desire to
come across as the kind of people who would make good teammates. And the ideal teammate
doesn’t lose bets (because losing bets—even if they were rational bets to take—signals, perhaps
unfairly, a vicious rashness) and doesn’t have unstable preferences (because fickleness makes
one’s behavior problematically hard to predict).
3 What about asocial creatures? Or what about agents about whom it is stipulated that they,
for example, only care about money? Doesn’t it also seem like these creatures can behave
irrationally in virtue of falling afoul of a diachronic norm? Yes, but I think that our intuitions
about such cases shouldn’t be fully trusted. I’ll hold off on discussing this point more fully
until section 6.
4 This debate bears, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, on several different issues
in philosophy. In moral psychology, there are questions about the nature and normative
status of intentions and other future-directed attitudes which govern the behavior of rational
agents through time (e.g., Bratman 2010, 2012; Gauthier 1997; Holton 2009; Velleman
2000). In Bayesian epistemology, there are questions about the extent which various epistemic
principles—like Conditionalization and Reflection—are motivated by Diachronic Dutch Book
arguments (e.g., Briggs 2009; Christensen 1991; Levi 2002; Maher 1992; Schick 1986; Skyrms
1987, 1993; Teller 1976; van Fraassen 1995). Relatedly, there are issues in the foundation of
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A requirement is synchronic if it tells you how things ought to be at a
time, and a requirement is diachronic if it tells you how things ought to be
across time. A requirement of rationality is fundamentally and irreducibly
diachronic so long as someone can fail to satisfy it without violating any
synchronic requirements.
Following Hedden (2015a, 2015b), let Time-Slice Rationality be the view
that there are no fundamental, irreducible diachronic norms of rationality;
all fundamental requirements of rationality are synchronic.5
There are compelling reasons on both sides of this issue. On the one
hand, it certainly seems, in many cases, like there are irreducibly diachronic
requirements of this sort. Take, for instance, the example which opens this
paper: by trading your banana for my apple and then trading back, you
suffer diachronic misfortune; but it’s not obvious what, if any, synchronic
requirement you’ve violated. Nevertheless, your behavior seems irrational.
On the other hand, the existence of fundamental, irreducible diachronic ra-
tional requirements appears to conflict with a modest version of internalism,
according to which behaving rationally is a matter of doing what makes
the most sense to you, given your perspective. What I did, or believed,
or cared about last week aren’t facts about what I am currently doing,
believing, or caring about. And insofar as rationality is concerned with how
my actions, beliefs, and desires all hang together, what actually transpired
in the past isn’t relevant to what it’s rational for me to do now. And so,
if internalism about rationality is right, there cannot be any fundamental
diachronic requirements of rationality.6
Bayesian decision theory about the extent to which its axioms can be justified by appealing to
diachronic behavior in sequential decision problems (e.g., Davidson et al. 1955; Hammond
1976, 1988; Levi 1991; Machina 1989; McClennen 1990; Rabinowicz 1995; Ramsey 1926;
Seidenfeld 1988; Steele 2010). There’s an issue in game theory regarding the conditions under
which a game in strategic form is equivalent to a game in extensive for (e.g., Seidenfeld 1994;
Stalnaker 1999). Recently, several philosophers have addressed this question directly (e.g.,
Carr 2015; Ferrero 2012, 2009; Hedden 2015a,b; Meacham 2010b; Moss 2015).
5 In addition, Time-Slice Rationality, as espoused by Hedden (2015a), holds that “your beliefs
about what attitudes you have at other times play the same role as your beliefs about what
attitudes other people have” (452). According to the view, the requirements of rationality are
both synchronic and impersonal. This paper focuses more heavily on the former feature.
6 See Hedden 2015a (and Carr 2015; Moss 2015) for more discussion on the motivation
that internalism provides for Time-Slice Rationality. I think the most helpful way to see the
point is to focus on the so-called action-guiding role of the rational ‘ought.’ Rationality, the
thought goes, should provide us with some guidance about what to do. And if there are
irreducibly diachronic requirements, rationality will have trouble offering us helpful advice,
in some cases. Why? We have to decide what to do at a time. And in order for the rational
requirements to be operationalizable—that is, for the advice they give to be useful—they have
to make reference only to that which is, in some sense, accessible to me. For example, “Buy
the winning lotto ticket” is good advice in the sense that, so long as I succeed in complying
with it, I am guaranteed riches; but it is bad advice in that it is supremely unhelpful. I don’t
know how to succeed in taking the advice unless I know which ticket is the winner, and that’s
something that needn’t be (and usually isn’t) accessible to me. Moreover, that which is not
encompassed in my current perspective will not be accessible to me at the time the decision is
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There is a tension here. That being said, Time-Slice Rationality needn’t
be a revisionary thesis—that is, one that radically consigns many of our
plausible first-order rational principles to the flames. Proponents of the
view instead argue that much of the work done by diachronic requirements
can be equally well done by synchronic requirements alone.7 It’s not my
intention in this paper to argue for Time-Slice Rationality; maybe there
are fundamental, irreducible diachronic norms and maybe there aren’t.
Instead, I will offer an explanation for why, in some cases, it seems like
there are norms governing our diachronic behavior even if the proponents
of Time-Slice Rationality are correct that there aren’t any.
3 Sequential Choice and Diachronic Misfortune
I claim that the cases of diachronic misfortune that strike us as irrational
are those in which one has the opportunity to act so as to disguise the
fact that one has suffered diachronic misfortune but fails to do so. Let me
bring this out by considering two structurally analogous cases of diachronic
misfortune.8
Generous Game Show.9 You are on a very generous
game show. There are two boxes before you: box
A and box B . Box A contains an all-expenses-paid
alpine skiing vacation, and box B contains an all-
expenses-paid beach vacation. (And you know which
made. But diachronic norms, insofar as they are irreducibly diachronic, make reference to
features—namely, features about the past or the future—that might not be accessible to my
current perspective. For example, while the norm “Follow through on the plans you made
yesterday” is genuinely diachronic, the quasi-diachronic norm “Follow though on the plans
you currently believe you made yesterday” needn’t be. The latter is, in the relevant sense,
synchronic; it only makes reference to features (e.g., what you currently believe about what
you previously did) that are accessible to your current perspective. (Thanks to an anonymous
referee for suggesting this example.)
7 For example, Hedden (2015b) argues that diachronic principles in Bayesian epistemology,
like Conditionalization and Reflection, can be replaced with purely synchronic analogs without
much loss.
8 The phenomenon of diachronic misfortune is more general than what Hedden calls di-
achronic tragedy: cases in which you have attitudes that “lead you to act over time in a
manner that is to your own acknowledged, predictable disadvantage” (2015a, 423). I’m
interested in misfortune, not tragedy; your performance of a suboptimal sequence needn’t be
foreseeable. (In fact, several of the cases in Hedden 2015a are actually examples of what I call
diachronic misfortune, and not diachronic tragedy.) Ending up in a suboptimal outcome, of
course, is not ipso facto irrational; that happens every time we lose a bet, and it’s certainly
not always irrational to take bets. But as some of Hedden’s examples bring out, it’s not just
foreseeable misfortune that strikes us as irrational. By focusing on the more general phenome-
non, we can get clearer about which features our intuitions about diachronic rationality are
sensitive to.
9 This example is a variation on a case given in Hedden 2015a. In Hedden’s version, you suffer
diachronic misfortune because you have “imprecise preferences”: your preference-ordering is
incomplete.
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box contains which prize.) The game has two rounds.
In Round 1, you get to decide to place a $50 voucher
in one of the two boxes. In Round 2, you get decide
which box to take. The rounds happen quickly; as
soon as you decide what to do in Round 1, you have
to make your Round 2 decision.
Suppose that you’d be happy with either vacation, but you slightly prefer
the beach vacation to the ski vacation. You decide to place the $50 voucher
in box B . Round 1 ends and Round 2 begins. You have a change of
heart—you think about how fun it would be to ski the slopes—and come
to prefer the alpine ski vacation to the beach vacation. You decide to take
box A.
Generous Game Show


A+
¨
Ski vacation.
$50 voucher.
Take box A
B
¨
Beach vacation.
No voucher.Take b
ox B
$50 in box A

B+
¨
Beach vacation.
$50 voucher.
Take box B
A
¨
Ski vacation.
No voucher.Take b
ox A
$50
in b
ox
B
FIGURE 1. Generous Game Show tree-diagram.
There are a couple things to be said about this case. First, your diachronic
behavior—putting the $50 voucher in box B during Round 1, then choosing
box A during Round 2—seems irrational. There are, of course, ways
of filling out the story so that your behavior no longer seems irrational.
Imagine, for example, that after putting the voucher in box B , you receive
an emergency call from your physician informing you that you’re allergic
to salt water. It no longer seems irrational for you to choose box A. All I’m
claiming is that, absent details like these, your diachronic behavior strikes
us as irrational.
Second, this is a case in which you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune—
you’ve performed a suboptimal sequence of actions
〈$50 in box B , Take box A〉
—without (seemingly) doing anything synchronically irrational. Given your
feelings about the two vacations during Round 2, it’s rationally permissible
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for you to take box A over box B . But was it rationally permissible for
you to put the $50 in box B during Round 1? That depends on what you,
during Round 1, believed you would do at Round 2. (If, for example, you
were 100% confident at time t1 that you’d take box A during Round 2, it
would be synchronically irrational for you to put the $50 voucher in box
B .) It’s rationally permissible for you to place the $50 voucher in box B
just so long as you are, at time t1, reasonably confident that you will take
box B in Round 2.10 It is perhaps more accurate, then, to represent your
predicament with the tree-diagram in Figure 2, which makes explicit the
role uncertainty regarding your future preferences plays in your decision
during Round 1.
In Generous Game Show, you place the $50 voucher in box B at Round
1 because you prefer the beach vacation to the ski vacation and you are
reasonably confident that your preferences won’t switch in Round 2. Then,
at time t2, you learn that your preferences have changed: you now prefer the
ski vacation to the beach. Acting on these preferences, you decide to take
box A (and thus forgo the $50 voucher). It looks like you’ve acted rationally
at each time. But it also looks like you’ve done something diachronically
irrational.
And now consider the following case.
Gamble Game Show. You are on a game show similar
in many respects to the previous one. There are two
boxes before you: box A and box B . One of the boxes
contains an all-expenses-paid cruise vacation, and the
other box contains an all-expenses paid dude ranch
vacation. But you don’t know which box contains
which prize. You (as well as the studio audience and
the viewers at home) do know, however, that the host
has rolled a six-sided die: if the die rolled a six, then
the dude ranch vacation was placed in box A and the
cruise vacation was placed in box B ; otherwise, the
dude ranch prize is in box B and the cruise prize is in
10 How confident is “reasonably confident”? At time t1 you slightly prefer the beach vacation
to the ski vacation. Let p be your credence at time t1 that by the moment of choice at Round
2 your preference will have shifted in favor of the ski vacation. It’s rationally permissible
to put the money in box B just so long as the expected utility of doing so is just as great as
putting the money in box A. So,
e u($50 in box B) ≥ e u($50 in box A)
p · u(A)+ (1− p) · u(B+) ≥ p · u(A+)+ (1− p) · u(B)
(B+−B) ≥ p · ((A+−A)+ (B+−B))
u($50) ≥ 2 · p · u($50)
1
2
≥ p
You have to think it more likely than not that your preference for the beach vacation over the
ski vacation will remain stable up to the moment of choice at Round 2.
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Generous Game Show (Learn Your Preferences)
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FIGURE 2. Generous Game Show tree-diagram (learn prefer-
ences at Round 2).
box A. Again, the game has two rounds. In Round 1,
you get to decide to place a $50 voucher in one of the
two boxes. Then, in Round 2, after learning which
prize is in which box, you get to decide which box to
take home.
Suppose that you slightly prefer the dude ranch vacation to the cruise
vacation. Because you know that there is a five-sixths chance that the dude
ranch prize is in box B , you decide to place the $50 voucher in box B during
Round 1. You then learn—unfortunately for you—that the die didn’t roll
in your favor: the cruise vacation is in box B and the dude ranch vacation
is in box A. You decide, in Round 2, to take box A—and, thus, forego the
$50 voucher.
You’ve suffered diachronic misfortune, but it doesn’t seem like you’ve
acted irrationally in this case. What accounts for the difference?
In this case, just as in the previous one, you suffer diachronic misfortune
by performing a sequence of actions resulting in an outcome that is worse,
by your own lights, than the outcome that would have resulted had you
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Gambling Game Show
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FIGURE 3. Gamble Game Show tree-diagram.
gone “down” instead of “up” at the first choice-node. In each case it was
rational for you to go “up” at the first node given your beliefs and desires at
that time. But we’re inclined to judge your diachronic behavior in Generous
Game Show more harshly than in Gamble Game Show. Why is that?
There are several potentially relevant disanalogies between the two cases
that might account for the difference. One might think, for example, that
suffering diachronic misfortune in Generous Game Show is irrational but
not in Gambling Game Show because, in the former but not the latter,
you’ve failed to follow through on an intention that you formed during
Round 1 and it’s irrational to fail to follow through on your intentions. But
that needn’t be the case. In both cases, you take a bet (broadly construed)
and lose. In Generous Game Show, you haven’t formed the intention to
take box B ; rather, you’ve made a prediction about what you will feel like
doing in Round 2, and acted on the basis of that prediction. (In fact, we
can imagine that you don’t have strong feelings one way or the other about
which vacation is better during Round 1. You place the $50 voucher in box
B not because you right now prefer the beach vacation to the alpine skiing
vacation, but rather because you right now predict that you will prefer
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the beach vacation. When we intend to φ, generally, we prefer that our
future selves φ whether or not our future selves feel like doing so, but your
preferences in Round 1 needn’t be like that.)
Here’s a different thought. Although in both cases you’ve lost a bet, in
Generous Game Show it’s a bet that turns on what your preferences will
be in Round 2, while in Gamble Game Show it’s a bet that turns on which
vacation prize is in which box. And one might think that your diachronic
behavior in the former case, but not the latter, is irrational because beliefs
about your future preferences are beliefs about you. And being wrong
about yourself might seem closer to a rational failing than being wrong
about some feature of the world—like how the die landed—that is entirely
external to you. Maybe, one might think, this is because which box you
take in Round 2 is something within your control, whereas which box
contains which prize is not. But that doesn’t seem right. Although which
box is chosen in Round 2 is within your control during Round 2, it’s at
least not obvious that this is something under your control in Round 1.11
(Furthermore, in this case, you haven’t placed a bet on what you will do
in Round 2; rather, you’ve placed a bet on what your preferences will
be in Round 2. And it’s even less obvious that we are able to exercise
voluntary control over our future preferences.) More importantly, if Time-
Slice Rationality is correct, it’s unclear how a distinction like this could
make a rational difference. On that view, facts about the preferences of
your future self are external to you right now in much the same way as
facts about which box contains which prize.
Instead, I claim that the relevant difference between these two cases—
the difference that accounts for our inclination to judge your diachronic
behavior more harshly in the former than in the latter—is that, in the
former case but not the latter, you have at time t2 the ability to disguise the
fact that you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune. Taking the box in which
you placed the $50 voucher is consistent with a story about you according
to which everything is going your way (e.g., your preferences are stable,
you understand yourself, you haven’t lost any bets, etc.), whereas taking
the other box is not consistent with a flattering story like this. On the other
hand, in Gamble Game Show, there’s nothing you can do to disguise the
fact that you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune. Whether you take box A
or box B , you reveal that you lost a bet (in the broadest understanding of
the phrase); the studio audience and the viewers at home, given that they
11 This brings up an interesting issue about self-binding. We’ve been assuming that your
options during Round 1 only concern where to allocate the voucher. But if you have the
ability to self-bind, your options during Round 1 might better be represented as follows:
put-voucher-in-box-A-and-take-box-A, put-voucher-in-box-A-and-take-box-B , put-voucher-
in-box-B-and-take-box-A, put-voucher-in-box-B-and-take-box-B . If these are your available
options during Round 1, then opting for put-voucher-in-box-B-and-take-box-A is straight-
forwardly synchronically irrational. I will postpone further discussion of self-binding until
section 5.
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know it is reasonably likely that the dude ranch vacation is in box B , are
able to infer from your decision in Round 1 that you must prefer the dude
ranch vacation to the cruise vacation; and so, no matter what you do in
Round 2, you reveal that you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune.
I am not claiming, however, that you can in one case but not the other
avoid suffering diachronic misfortune by acting differently at time t2; in
both cases, you will suffer diachronic misfortune no matter what you do at
that time. Rather, the difference comes down to whether or not you can
act so as to hide your diachronic misfortune. In Generous Game Show,
you can; in Gamble Vacation Game Show, you cannot. If you happened
to care about hiding your diachronic misfortune—and I will argue that
we do in fact care about this—that would give you a reason in the former
case but not the latter to act differently at time t2 than you did. And if
this reason is sufficiently strong—strong enough to outweigh other relevant
considerations—you’ve done something synchronically irrational at time
t2.
12
If we have standing non-instrumental desire to hide our diachronic
misfortune (when it’s possible to do so), we can explain why, in some cases,
it seems like there are irreducible diachronic requirements of rationality
even if, in fact, there aren’t any. But what exactly would such a desire look
like? And why think this is something we care about?
4 Spinning a Flattering Social Story
I’ve claimed that we care about making it appear as if we’ve avoided
diachronic misfortune when it’s feasible to do so. (Of course, often a great
way to ensure that it appears as if you avoided diachronic misfortune is
to avoid diachronic misfortune in the first place.) The desire to maintain
plausible deniability about having suffered diachronic misfortune can help
to explain why we feel rational pressure to carry on with our past projects
in some cases and not others.
First, allow me to explain what it is to desire to maintain plausible
deniability about having suffered diachronic misfortune, and why it is that
12 What about a variant of Gambling Game Show in which your decision about where to
allocate the $50 voucher doesn’t reveal your preferences over the vacations? Take, for example,
a case in which no one, except for you, has any idea which box contains which prize. You
have some private, personal evidence that box B contains the dude ranch vacation. And no
one (including yourself) has any reason to think you have a strong preference for one of the
vacations over the other. You slightly prefer the dude ranch vacation to the cruise vacation,
so you put the $50 voucher in box B ; it turns out that you were wrong about which box
contained which prize. Would it be irrational for you to choose box A nonetheless? By taking
box B you have a greater chance of hiding your diachronic misfortune. I contend that in cases
like these, we would feel some rational pressure to take box B . It needn’t be irrational to fail
to do so, however. To put this differently, it’s not irrational for you to honor your sunk costs
by going home with the contents of box B (unless your desire to maintain plausible deniability
about having suffered diachronic misfortune is outweighed by other considerations).
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I think it’s plausible to expect creatures like us—creatures who crucially
rely on cooperating with one another—to, as a matter of psychological fact,
have such a desire.
4.1 Signaling in the Social World
We live in a social world in which our choice-behavior is, very often the
subject of examination by others. Navigating through the world involves
interacting with each other. This, in turn, involves coming to understand
what others believe, care about, and value and making sufficiently reliable
predictions about their future behavior given this understanding. To get on
with one another, we must construct rough-and-ready folk psychological
theories of each other. These theories are based on our evidence about each
other’s choice-behavior.13,14
Often then, in addition to whatever else they do, our actions signal
something about ourselves to others. Sometimes, in fact, the signaling-
power of an action is so compelling that we’re, ironically, disposed to
perform it at the expense of undermining the thing we wanted to signal
about ourselves.15 Regardless of the power of the signal, all the decisions
we make have the potential to communicate something about ourselves,
no matter how weakly or defeasibly. When you opt for X over Y, you
suggest—albeit defeasibly—that, all else equal, you prefer X to Y. And, if
you’ve always opted for X over Y in the past, it wouldn’t be unreasonable
for an onlooker to predict that, all else equal, you’ll opt for X over Y, again,
in the future. If you care about what your choice-behavior signals about
you, it’s reasonable for you to take this into account when deciding what
to do. Moreover, I think, as a matter of psychological fact, we do care
13 Note that ‘choice-behavior’ is here being understood in its broadest sense so as to include,
for example, linguistic behavior. What we say to one another is a major source of evidence—
but not, by any means, the only source of evidence—about what what we believe and care
about.
14 The idea that rationality plays a crucial role in predicting and explaining behavior via
attributing folk psychological states to each other has been developed and defended, among
others, by Davidson (1973), Lewis (1974), Pettit (1991), and Ramsey (1926).
15 I have in mind cases in which you, in some sense, want to signal that you care about X , but
select an action that promotes X less effectively than another available action would because
the former action increases the chances of reliably signaling what you want to signal than the
latter. There are a number of interesting cases of this. There’s the example in evolutionary
biology of the male stalk-eyed fly, whose large eye span, it’s been hypothesized, serves as a
costly signal of fitness despite undermining it (Zahavi 1975). Another example is the Prius
Halo (Sexton and Sexton 2014), which hypothesizes that the fact that the Toyota Prius
dominates the hybrid car market is because of its distinctive (some might say ‘unattractive’)
look. The idea being that environmentally conscious consumers choose to purchase a Prius
rather than its competitors—even when those competitors are more attractive both financially
and environmentally—because the Prius’s unique look provides a stronger public signal of
environmental consciousness. Robin Hanson is famous for analyzing a wide variety of large-
scale social phenomena (e.g., Hanson 2008) in terms of signaling (see Simler and Hanson
2018).
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about what we can sensibly expect our choice-behavior to lead a reasonable
observer to conclude about us. And, I’ll argue, this is something, given our
nature as social creatures, we cannot help but care about.
4.2 Social Evolution and the Desire to Maintain Plausible Deniability
Social coordination is essential to our success as social creatures. Social
coordination requires that I take you to be, and you take me to be, a good
cooperator. In order to make myself appear like a good cooperator, I must
present myself in a good light. Communities of successful cooperators are
more successful than communities of unsuccessful cooperators. We can
expect then that “traits” (broadly construed) conducive to successful coop-
eration will be “selected” for.16 We’ve come to internalize the capacities,
dispositions, and sentiments necessary for being decent cooperators in a
social world.
I’m gesturing here toward a family of arguments familiar from evolution-
ary game theory.17 A pattern of behavior is explained by, first, analyzing it
in terms of a game-theoretic strategy, and then by showing that the strategy
is evolutionarily stable under certain conditions. One way of interpreting
these results is to understand the payoffs of the games plugged into the
evolutionary dynamics materially and to understand the various strategies
under consideration as corresponding to various preference profiles defined
over those material payoffs. Consequently, we can understand the agents,
who are the subjects of the evolutionary dynamics, as always acting ra-
tionally (i.e., they all perform the action that they most prefer from those
available). Evolutionarily stable strategies will correspond to those pref-
erence profiles—or those ways of valuing material goods—that would be
selected for (under the conditions specified elsewhere in the model). In this
way, these sorts of argument in evolutionary game theory can be thought
of as explaining how, and under what conditions, certain motivational
features (e.g., certain desires, norms) can become internalized by agents.
In order to cooperate effectively—and, more generally, in order to suc-
cessfully coordinate with each other—we must be able to reliably make
fairly accurate predictions about both the future behavior of others and our-
selves. We have to make these predictions, often, on the basis of somewhat
meager evidence. Consequently, we have reasons to present to each other
coherent narratives of ourselves—that is, we have reasons to act so that a
16 I put ‘traits’ and ‘selected’ in scare quotes in order to indicate that the evolutionary mecha-
nism at work here needn’t be that of biological evolution—and so needn’t involve phenotypic
information transmitted reproductively—but, are more plausibly, the work of sociocultural
evolution—in which norms, values, and general social information is transmitted culturally
(McGeer 2001, 2007; Ross 2005). The characteristics under discussion here are more memetic
than genetic (but could, of course, be both).
17 See, for example, Axelrod 1986; Binmore 1998; Gintis 2000; Frank 1987; Maynard Smith
1982; Skyrms 2004, 1996; and Young 1998.
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competent observer would be able to make fairly accurate predictions of
our future choice-behavior on the basis of our past choice-behavior.18
Of course, making oneself predictable to oneself and others is not by
any means the only characteristic that the social evolutionary pressure to
successfully cooperate might inculcate. Maximally attractive prospective
teammates, for example, are—in addition to being stable—not overly prone
to taking losing bets. In short, to make oneself into an attractive candidate
for social collaboration, one must avoid the stench of failure (Baumeister
1982; Baumeister 1999; Schlenker 1980; Trivers 2000).
Suffering diachronic misfortune, although not an infallible indicator of
irrationality, is an indicator of failure. Here’s why. There are two main ways
to suffer diachronic misfortune: one, you take a gamble (in a broad sense),
and lose; or, two, you exhibit diachronically unstable choice-behavior (as if
in response to a preference shift).
Consider way two. By exhibiting diachronically unstable choice-behavior,
you make yourself hard to predict.19 If you’re hard to predict, you’re hard
to coordinate with. If we can’t coordinate with you, you will make a
less-than-ideal teammate. There’s pressure on us, then, to present ourselves
in ways that uphold the appearance of consistency (Cialdini 2001; Stone
et al. 1997; Swann 1985; Tedeschi et al. 1971).20
Consider way one. By taking a gamble and losing, you risk revealing
that you made a bad prediction. Of course, it’s not necessarily irrational to
lose a bet—so, a team’s pro tanto desire to not be associated with bet-losers
might seem like a matter of superstition21—but given the meager amount of
information we have about each other’s behavior, it’s difficult to determine
18 The relationship between narrative, folk psychology, and the construction of “the self” has
been explored in philosophy (e.g., Dennett 1992; Velleman 2005) and in cognitive science
(e.g., Goldie 2012; Gazzaniga 1998; Hutto 2007; Ross 2005). A common theme throughout
is the importance of the role that narrative plays in social coordination, which often requires
presenting a unified account of our behavior.
19 Diachronically unstable choice-behavior is difficult to rationalize as the product of coherent
beliefs and desires had by a unified agent, who cares about things in ways that we around
here find intelligible. It’s not difficult, in general, to rationalize an agent’s behavior if we are
allowed to individuate the outcomes of the decision-problems the agent faces as finely as
need be—which amounts to representing the agent’s preferences as sensitive to those features
individuating the outcomes (see, e.g., Broome 1993; Dreier 1996; Pettit 1991). But we rescue
the unified agent’s coherence at the expense of representing her as caring about things that we
might find hard to understand. Either way, our ability to predict the agent’s behavior suffers.
20 What counts as diachronically consistent is a more complicated matter than I’m letting on.
One can suffer diachronic misfortune as the result of diachronically unstable choice-behavior
in a way that doesn’t make one’s future behavior hard to predict. For example, predictable
preference shifts—like those that standardly occur as we mature, or like those that typically
accompany significant life changes—in virtue of being predictable, needn’t undermine our
ability to coordinate with each other. More will be said about this in section 5.
21 Whether or not this is a matter of superstition, it appears to be a real phenomenon. We
are often judged by our success and failures, even when they are the product of chance. For
example, dealers at casinos are sometimes removed from their posts, and even fired, after
suffering a sufficiently long streak of bad luck (Goffman 1967).
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whether your decision to take the gamble was a rational one. We want
teammates who are good at assessing their evidence and who appropriately
account for risk. As the number of bets you lose increases, the likelier it
seems that you are failing on these fronts. This provides you with a reason
to hide your losses when it’s easy to do so, even if you lost a bet that was
rational to have taken given what you knew at the time.
Moreover, it is particularly bad to reveal that you’ve lost a bet that turns
on how you will feel, what you will do, or what your preferences will be,
and the like. When making a prediction about yourself, it’s presumed that
you have a privileged position with respect to the relevant evidence, and it’s
often particularly opaque to others exactly what this evidence specifically
is. The more private your evidence, the more vulnerable you are to charges
that you failed to assess it correctly. And, furthermore, by revealing that
you’ve made a bad a prediction about yourself, you reveal that you aren’t
predictable even to yourself. And, as prospective teammates might very
well worry, if you aren’t predictable to yourself, what hope is there for the
rest of us? Someone who is bad at predicting what they themselves will do
is someone for whom it’s reasonable to think it will be difficult for the rest
of us to predict as well.
If you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune, there is nothing you can do to
change that. It might yet be possible, however, for you to avoid signaling
to others that you have, and thus avoid acquiring the reputation as a
subpar teammate. So, insofar as there is social evolutionary pressure to
cooperate with one another, there is likewise pressure to present oneself
as an attractive teammate. Maintaining plausible deniability about having
suffered diachronic misfortune (i.e., acting so that your choice-behavior
can be woven into a flattering self narrative) is instrumental in presenting
oneself as an attractive teammate. And so it’s not unreasonable to expect a
process of social evolution to instill in social creatures like us a deep-rooted
desire to maintain plausibility about having suffered a diachronic mistake.
Because evolution doesn’t paint with a fine-brush, we’ve come to internalize
this desire as a non-instrumental one.
Here’s an analogy. I have, as I’m sure you do too, a pro tanto desire
for things that taste sweet. When pushed, I cannot offer a satisfying
justification of the reasonableness of this desire. I don’t, for example, desire
sweetness as the means to some end. I simply like things that taste sweet.
I’m hard pressed to say much more than that. It isn’t, though, mysterious
why I, and creatures like me, desire things that taste sweet. Most things
that are sweet contain sugar. And sugar has fitness-promoting caloric
properties. Creatures who desired sweet things did better than creatures
who didn’t. Although NutraSweet doesn’t contain the fitness-promoting
caloric properties of sugar, it still tastes sweet to me. And although (granting
the evolutionary story I’ve sketched) the reason, in some sense, that I non-
instrumentally desire sweetness has to do with the caloric properties of
sugar, it isn’t unreasonable to desire NutraSweet. I think, in some important
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respects, our desire to maintain plausible deniability about having suffered
diachronic misfortune is like my pro tanto desire for sweet foods.
In addition to this speculative story for why it might be that we’d come
to internalize the desire to spin flattering yet plausible autobiographical
narratives, there is a fair amount of empirical evidence that we do, as
a matter of psychological fact, care quite strongly (albeit, not always
consciously) about our self-presentation.22 For example, Kurzban and
Aktipis (2007) propose that humans have internalized a set of cognitive
mechanisms, which they call the Social Cognitive Interface (SCI), that is
“designed for strategic manipulation of others’ representations of one’s traits,
abilities, and prospects” (131). These mechanisms, they argue, are the result
of competition for partnerships, group memberships, and other positions
of social value (Cosmides 1989; Kurzban and Leary 2001; Levine and
Kurzban 2006; Tooby and Cosmides 1996). The mechanisms are designed
to strike the optimal balance in self-presentation between favorability and
plausibility (Baumeister 1982; Schlenker 1975). In particular, one primary
function of these mechanisms is to maintain the appearance of consistency
(Stone et al. 1997; Swann 1985; Tedeschi et al. 1971).23 Furthermore,
although these mechanisms serve a social function, there’s evidence that
the mechanisms exert motivational force on us even in private (Baumeister
1982; Briggs 2009; Shrauger and Schoeneman 1979; Tice and Baumeister
2001). We come to see ourselves as we imagine others see us. And so we
don’t, for example, stop caring about our (flattering yet plausible) social
story when we know no one else is looking. In order to effectively convince
others, we often must convince ourselves.
4.3 Plausible Deniability
For you to maintain plausible deniability about something, you have to
construct a narrative about your behavior that’s plausible. But what is it
for a narrative to be plausible? And for whom are we constructing our
narratives?
22 For an accessible summary of the evidence from evolutionary psychology, see Kurzban
2010. See also Simler and Hanson 2018, which draws on work in microsociology, social
psychology, primatology, and economics to argue that, because of our social nature, we’ve
evolved to disguise various “ugly” motives as “pretty” ones (both to others and ourselves).
We have, they argue, hidden motives to signal that we have certain socially valuable attributes.
They then argue that a wide variety of large-scale social phenomena (e.g., charity, education,
healthcare, religion, politics) can be fruitfully illuminated by taking these hidden motives
seriously. My claim is consistent with theirs, but is more modest. All I’m claiming is that—for
reasons similar to theirs—we’ve come to care non-instrumentally about our self-narratives.
23 Kurzban and Aktipis (2007) say, for example, that “one important design feature of the SCI
is to maintain a store of representations that allow consistency in one’s speech and behavior
that constitute the most favorable and defensible set of negotiable facts that can be used for
persuasive purposes” (135).
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4.3.1 Ways of Hiding Your Diachronic Misfortune
You will not be able to construct a plausible narrative about your behavior
according to which you haven’t suffered diachronic misfortune when it is
obvious that you’ve taken an action that has resulted in an outcome O
which is sub-optimal relative to an outcome that’s diachronically accessible
to you. For example, in Generous Game Show, the outcome in which
you prefer the alpine ski vacation to the beach vacation and take the box
containing the ski vacation plus the $50 voucher is obviously better than
the outcome in which you prefer the ski vacation to the beach vacation
and take the box containing only the ski vacation (and no voucher); and,
in Gamble Game Show, the outcome in which you enjoy the dude ranch
vacation plus $50 is obviously better than the outcome in which you go to
the dude ranch without the money. When you bring about these outcomes,
then, you reveal your diachronic misfortune.
If you want to tell a plausible story according to which you haven’t
suffered diachronic misfortune, there are two ways to do it. First, if it is
obvious that O is sub-optimal, you might yet be able to maintain plausible
deniability by misrepresenting O as some other outcome. This can be
accomplished if the state of the world that partially constitutes O is suitably
non-public. Take, for example, Generous Game Show. Given that you
prefer a ski vacation to a beach vacation, it’s obvious that you would prefer
a ski vacation plus $50 to a beach vacation plus $50. But, because your
preferences over vacation destinations are non-public, you might be able
to hide your diachronic misfortune by hiding that your preferences have
shifted by opting to take box B . A story according to which you place the
$50 voucher in box B and then take box B is a story that’s consistent with
you being on the best-of-all branches of the decision tree.
Second, if it is obvious that outcome O is the outcome your actions have
brought about, you might yet be able to maintain plausible deniability by
disguising the fact that you prefer a diachronically accessible outcome to O.
Here’s an example. Suppose you are invited to your friend’s cocktail party.
You believe that your idol will be in attendance, and so you rent a suit to
wear in an effort to impress her. You then learn that she won’t be there. It
wouldn’t be odd to dress up for such an occasion, but had you not already
rented the suit, you’d slightly prefer to dress more casually. By wearing the
suit you can hide that you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune so long as it’s
plausible—as it very well might be—that you all along preferred to wear a
suit to the party. Although it will be obvious that you are wearing a suit to
a function at which your idol is not present, it needn’t be obvious that this
is a sub-optimal outcome.
In Gamble Game Show, however, you cannot tell a plausible story
according to which you haven’t suffered diachronic misfortune. You prefer
the dude ranch to the cruise throughout, but are uncertain (at time t1) about
which box contains which prize. You believe the dude ranch vacation to
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be in box B , so you elect to put the $50 voucher in box B during Round
1. You learn at Round 2 that you were mistaken: the dude ranch vacation
was in box A. What you learn at time t2 is public: you cannot hide the facts
about which prize is in which box. Furthermore, the basis on which you
made the decision to put the $50 in box B during Round 1 was also public:
everyone knew it was likely that box B contained the dude ranch vacation,
and so you cannot hide which prize you preferred.
4.3.2 Plausibility
What makes a story about your behavior plausible? In order for the
narrative to be plausible, it’s not enough that your diachronic behavior
merely meet some formal constraints. The story must also attribute attitudes
to you that seem reasonable. What counts as plausible will depend on the
kinds of things that we around here consider to be relatively natural to care
about.
Here’s an example. Imagine you are going on a camping trip. The
forecast calls for rain, so you rent an expensive raincoat. When you get
to the campsite, however, it becomes clear that it is not going to rain.
You could still wear the raincoat, but you opt not to do so. You’ve
suffered diachronic misfortune—given how things turned out, it would’ve
been better overall had you not rented the raincoat in the first place—
but it’s clearly not irrational to not wear the raincoat unnecessarily, and
there is no rational pressure whatsoever to do so. You would reveal
that you’ve suffered diachronic misfortune whether or not you wear the
raincoat. There is no plausible story about you according to which you
rent the raincoat, it doesn’t rain, you wear it anyway, and you haven’t
stumbled into a suboptimal outcome. The weather is public, so you cannot
disguise your diachronic misfortune in the first of the two ways discussed
above. Furthermore, it’s not reasonable—given the kinds of things that we
around here care about—to take you to prefer wearing a rented raincoat
unnecessarily to enjoying the sunny day having never rented the raincoat in
the first place. People don’t wear raincoats on sunny days.
A similar point holds in Gamble Game Show: there is no plausible story
about you according to which you put the $50 voucher in box B—thus
revealing that you prefer the dude ranch to the cruise—and then discover
that the cruise prize is in box B , and take the contents of box B , and yet
haven’t stumbled into a sub-optimal outcome. Which prize is in each box
(in Round 2) is public, and it’s not reasonable to take you to prefer $50 plus
the cruise vacation to $50 plus the dude ranch vacation.
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4.3.3 The Audience
For whom are we constructing these narratives? Our stories are partially
directed toward the other members of community, and partially directed
toward ourselves. As a heuristic (because it is not always possible to tell
who’s watching when), we might find it helpful to pretend that there is a
semi-omniscient God, whose epistemic access to us is not different in kind
or grain from the access afforded to our communities’ members, watching
us at all times. We’ve come to internalize the desire to weave our diachronic
behavior into a flattering yet plausible self-narrative non-instrumentally.
And so, the thought goes, we feel the force of this desire whether we know
that our behavior is the subject of public scrutiny or not. The claim is
that social evolution has imbued us with a motive to act almost as if we’re
always being watched. And, insofar as we are often both the authors of
and the audience to our own behavior, there is a sense in which we are
always being watched.24
4.4 Rational Agency
The view I’ve sketched shares some important similarities with Velleman’s
account of agency (see Velleman 2009, for example). Velleman holds that it
is constitutive of agency—or rather, constitutive of action, of which agents
are the authors—to aim for intelligibility: that is, to understand what one
is doing when one acts, and to act in a way that makes sense (to oneself
and others).25 Our standing desire to make ourselves intelligible is, for
Velleman, an inescapable one: without it, our actions wouldn’t be actions
and we wouldn’t be agents.
I agree in several respects with the spirit of Velleman’s view, but my
position diverges in two crucial ways. First, I’m arguing that we have a
standing desire to act in ways that can be felicitously woven together into a
flattering self-narrative. Spinning such a story involves, in part, acting in a
way that is intelligible, but it requires more than this, too. We want our
self-narratives to be flattering and that goes beyond mere intelligibility. The
story of a hapless loser might be intelligible, but it’s not flattering.
24 The idea is that we can, and often do, adopt an outsider’s view of our own actions, and
evaluate ourselves and our behaviors from that perspective (Smith 1759; Hogan and Briggs
1986).
25 Velleman (2009) draws an analogy between social interaction and theatrical improvisational
acting. Improvisational actors try to do what makes the most sense given the character they are
aiming to enact. We are, the thought goes, akin to improvisational actors enacting ourselves.
Action is, according to Velleman, a kind of self-enacting performance. (See also the subtle
discussion of social behavior in Goffman 1959, which also analyzes social interaction as
analogous to theatrical performance. Social interaction is akin to a performance in which
“actors” create and manage the impressions they impart to their “audience.”)
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Second, I don’t think this standing desire is a constitutively inescapable
aspect of agency. Mosquitos are arguably agents, for example, but their
actions are not guided by such a motive. Rather, the desire is inescapable
for us in a much weaker sense—a sense akin to Velleman’s notion of natural
inescapability. Given the kind of social creatures we are, it’s reasonable
to think that we’ve internalized this desire as way of getting along with
one another. And, furthermore, because the desire gives rise—in some
sense—to who we are as people, the desire becomes implicated deeply into
our self-identities. So, if we didn’t have the desire, it’s not that we’d cease to
be agents. Rather, if we didn’t have the desire, we’d cease to be recognizable
as anything like the deeply social agents we are.
My view also shares certain similarities with Ruth Chang’s account of
agency: Hybrid Voluntarism (Chang 2009, 2013, 2017). On her view,
there are two kinds of reasons: given reasons (i.e., considerations that are
reasons in virtue of something other than your own agency) and will-based
reasons (i.e., considerations that are reasons in virtue of some act of will).
If your given reasons fail to fully determine what to do, you can create a
new will-based reason by “putting your agency behind” some feature of
one of your options. In particular, if your given reasons are in equipoise
(i.e., you fail to have more, less, or equal reason to choose one thing over
another), you can, through an act of will, determine what you have most
all-things-considered reason to do. For example, suppose you’re choosing
between the alpine ski vacation and the beach vacation. And suppose that
your given reasons have run out: you don’t have more, or less, or equal
reason to choose one over the other. By focusing on one of the distinctively
valuable features of, say, the beach vacation (e.g., the pleasant way the sand
will feel beneath your feet), you can create for yourself a decisive will-based
reason to choose it. In so doing, you constrain your future choices by
making yourself into a certain kind of person. In Generous Game Show, if
your given reasons with respect to the prizes have run out, then you might,
by choosing to put the voucher in box B , thereby create a new will-based
reason to choose box B when the time comes.
My view is different from (although consistent with) Chang’s. On
my view, you have a standing desire to spin a flattering yet plausible
autobiographical narrative. What you do during Round 1 affects what you
should do during Round 2—not because of some newly created will-based
reason—but rather because it constrains how this desire can be satisfied.
By putting the voucher in box B , you endow the option take box B with a
property it wouldn’t have had otherwise—namely, the property of being
integratabtle into your flattering yet plausible narrative. Because you care
about your narrative, this gives you a reason to take box B . But this isn’t
a reason directly created by an act of will. Moreover, as mentioned in
section 3 you might treat your decision in Round 1 as one between gambles
that turn on what you’ll feel like doing in Round 2. And so you might
put the voucher in box B because you predict that you’ll feel like taking
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it, not because you’ve willed yourself a new reason to. In fact, your given
reasons needn’t have run out: if you want future-you to get what future-you
wants, and you predict that future-you will want box B , your given reasons
support putting the voucher in box B . On my view, you’ll nevertheless have
reason to take box B (even if your prediction didn’t pan out). On Chang’s
view, however, you wouldn’t; you haven’t created a new will-based reason
to choose box B . Finally, on Chang’s view, it’s unclear to what extent your
past choices constrain your future ones. Your commitment to a course of
action can be undone, and you can drift; you can plump for one course of
action over another without creating a new will-based reason. On my view,
however, your past choices affect your future ones whether or not you’ve
“put your agency behind” them. On my view, what matters is your concern
for your self-narrative, not some private exercise of your will (although
that might matter, too).
5 Does the Explanation Show Too Much?
Here’s a potential problem. There are examples of diachronic behavior,
very similar to those that strike us as irrational, which do not strike us
as irrational. The worry is that the explanation I’ve given cannot be
correct because it overgenerates; it predicts that certain cases of diachronic
misfortune should strike us as irrational that, as a matter of fact, do not.
In this section, we’ll look at one such case, and I will argue that my
explanation doesn’t make such a problematic prediction after all. And, in
fact, the explanation I’ve given in terms of the standing desire to maintain
plausible deniability about suffering diachronic misfortune nicely explains
the asymmetry between those cases of diachronic misfortune which strike
us as irrational and those that don’t.26 Consider the following case of
diachronic misfortune (borrowed from Sartre 1946):
26 Moss (2015) recognizes the possibility of asymmetries of this kind in cases in which agents
forego sure gains because of a change of heart. She suggests that these asymmetries can be
better accommodated if there are no genuine diachronic requirements of rationality than if
there are. And so they ultimately provide a point in favor of Time-Slice Rationality.
She says, “It is not clear that agents in these situations [like the one described in the
Sartrean story below] are strictly forbidden from changing their minds. In fact, we are
intuitively disposed to forgive some agents who forego sure money, even when their change of
heart is not prompted by any change in their evidence” (186). But also acknowledges that our
intuitions sometimes go the other way, pointing out that:
In general, we are most inclined to reject apparent mind changing as irra-
tional when it happens quickly, unreflectively, repeatedly, or for strategic
reasons. These intuitions can be comfortably accommodated by a theory
according to which changing your mind is not itself impermissible, namely
because the salient features of these cases may provide evidence that they
do not involve the same sort of genuine changes of mind exhibited by
agents in [those cases in which we’re disposed to be more forgiving, like
the Sartrean story]. By contrast, it is more difficult for blanket injunctions
against mind changing to accommodate the intuition that changing your
mind can sometimes be okay. (186)
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The Sartrean Sequence. You have to choose between
fighting the Nazis or tending to your sick mother.
There are pros and cons to each. You care about vari-
ous things, and you haven’t a clue as to how to weigh
them off against each other. You ask your French
philosophy professor for advice, but he’s no help. You
decide to fight the Nazis. You complete your basic
training, but then you reconsider and return to your
mother.
The Sartrean Sequence


M
¨
Care for Mom.
Don’t fight Nazis.
Stay home
N−
¨
Don’t care for Mom.
Fight Nazis, untrained.Go fig
ht, lat
e
Stay home

N
¨
Don’t care for Mom.
Fight Nazis.
Go fight
M−
¨
Care for Mom, after delay.
Don’t fight Nazis.Quit,
return
home
Joi
n a
rm
y
FIGURE 4. The Sartrean Sequence.
You suffer diachronic misfortune by performing the sequence
〈Join army, Quit, return home〉
which results in an outcome (M−) that is clearly worse than the outcome
that would’ve resulted (M ) had you performed the sequence
〈Stay home, Stay home〉
instead. It’s better to stay with your mother from the get-go than it is to stay
with your mother only after abandoning her while away at basic training.
Despite the structural similarities between this case and Generous Game
Show, we’re inclined to judge your behavior more harshly in the latter than
in the former. Furthermore, an argument analogous to the one sketched
for why your behavior in Generous Game Show strikes us as irrational
(i.e., that we have standing desires to spin flattering self-narratives about
Absent some story about how Time-Slice Rationality can plausibly accommodate these in-
tuitions, it’s not clear to me why we should expect its opponents to have a more difficult
time making sense of them, especially in light of the point made in Carr (2013) that one can
be blameless and nonetheless irrational (50–55). Opponents of Time-Slice Rationality can
accommodate the asymmetry by claiming that we’re inclined to be more forgiving in some
cases than in others, even though a diachronic norm has been violated in both.
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our diachronic behavior, and that end is better served by taking the box
that contains the $50 voucher) seems to go through equally well in Sartrean
Sequence. After completing basic training, when you are deliberating about
whether to continue on with the army or to return home to care for your
mother, you know that by returning home you give up any hope of telling a
plausible story about yourself according to which you’ve avoided suffering
diachronic misfortune. On the other hand, you also know that if you
continue on with the army, there is a flattering (and plausible) self-narrative
that could be told: a story according to which you decided to join the army
to fight Nazis, and then went off to do so.
If we have the standing desire to maintain plausible deniability about
suffering diachronic misfortune, and the desire is operative in Generous
Game Show as well as in Sartrean Sequence, why are we inclined to be
more forgiving about your behavior in the latter than the former? There
are three important differences between these two cases, each of which
affects the force of the desire to avoid revealing diachronic misfortune in
the latter case.
Difference 1: Stakes. Here’s one important difference between the cases.
In Generous Game Show (the case in which we’re prone to be less forgiving),
the stakes are relatively low: very little hangs on what you end up doing.
You’ll be going on a vacation, which you’ll find enjoyable no matter what
you do. In Sartrean Sequence (the case in which we’re prone to be more
forgiving), however, the stakes are relatively high: what you ultimately
end up doing matters a great deal. Your decision about what to do affects
other people who matter a great deal to you. What you do matters to your
mother, and it matters to your compatriots. This is a decision about which
we might think some handwringing is appropriate—compulsory, even.
I contend that this difference in stakes, in part, accounts for our inclina-
tion to be more forgiving in the one than the other. It’s not synchronically
irrational to fail at maintaining plausible deniability about having suffered
diachronic misfortune when your desire to do so is outweighed by other
considerations. Your desire to maintain plausible deniability is only one
among many, and it is only irrational to fail to do what you most prefer to
do all things considered. When the stakes are relatively high, the potential
satisfaction or frustration of this desire for a flattering self-narrative is just
a drop in the deliberative bucket, quite possibly lacking the power to tip
the scales.
Moreover, in Sartre Sequence, the stakes are high in a particular way:
they’re morally weighty. It seems morally inappropriate—selfish, or at least
viciously self-regarding—for your desire for a flattering self-narrative to
outweigh considerations of significant moral importance. Not only might
the reason this desire provides fail to tip the scales, it might fail to be a
reason of the right kind. Suppose, after completing basic training, you
are offered $50 to stay the course. I wouldn’t think you irrational if you
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turned it down in order to return home to your mother. Similarly, I don’t
think it’s irrational for you to turn down “the offer” of spinning a more
consistent self-narrative by staying to fight. Neither consideration—the
$50, the consistency of your self-narrative—is of the right kind to make the
difference when so much else of moral importance it at stake.
Difference 2: Duration Between Decisions. Another potential factor is
the difference in duration between actions in the sequence. In Generous
Game Show, relatively little time passes between your decision in Round 1
and your decision in Round 2. In Sartrean Sequence, however, months pass
between your decision to join the army and your later decision to ultimately
return home to your mother.
The more time that elapses between the actions in the sequence, the more
forgiving we’re disposed to be of agents who fail to maintain plausible
deniability about having suffered diachronic misfortune. Here are two
reasons this might be the case. First, when the duration between actions in
the sequence is very small, it’s less plausible—given background assump-
tions about how humans generally work—that you lacked the ability to
self-bind—that is, to perform the sequence “all at once” by forming an
intention and following through on it. In other words, when the decisions
occur one right after the other, we’re inclined to interpret the story in such
a way that bringing about the outcomes directly are assumed to be feasible
options for you; the tree-diagrams, in this case, would misrepresent the
decision.27 If you have the ability to self-bind, though, bringing about a
suboptimal outcome is straightforwardly synchronically irrational. And
when the decisions happen quickly, it’s harder to screen off the possibility
that the agent has the ability to self-bind in a way that our intuitions can
easily grasp. The second reason is this. The more time that passes between
actions in the sequence, the easier it is to fill in the story so that plausible
deniability has been maintained. This is because, as years fade, so does
one’s own and one’s “audience’s” memories. My life has changed a great
deal since I was in kindergarten; many years have passed, and I don’t feel
beholden to the projects or plans set into motion back then. So much time
has passed that I don’t risk undermining my self-narrative by effectively
ignoring, along with everyone else, the preferences I had in kindergarten.28
27 A similar point (about how to represent self-binding in decision trees) can be found in
Hammond 1976 and Meacham 2010a. For more on self-binding and it’s implications for
decision theory, see Arntzenius et al. 2004; Elster 2000; and Holton 2009.
28 Hare (1989) makes a similar point when he says, “I wanted, when a small boy, to be an
engine-driver when I grew up; when I have graduated as a classical scholar at the age of
18, and am going to take the Ph.D. in Greek literature, somebody unexpectedly offers me a
job as an engine driver. In deciding whether to accept it, ought I to give any weight to my
long-abandoned boyhood ambition?” (156). See also Bykvist 2003, 2006, on the import of
past preferences on current decision making.
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As time marches forward, the importance of paying service to one’s past
preferences in order to maintain a flattering self-narrative decays.
Difference 3: Transformative Power. Another difference between the two
stories—in addition to the difference in stakes, and the difference in dura-
tion between decisions—is that the decisions made in Sartrean Sequence
are, and the decisions made in Generous Game Show are not, in some
sense transformative. (In fact, this brings us closer to the point Sartre
himself seemed to use the example to make. Because of our existential
predicament, you (or the student, rather) must choose. And in so doing,
one affirms certain values that come to constitute one’s moral or practical
identity. (See Korsgaard 2009; Chang 2009, 2013, for further discussion.)
A choice might be transformative because it will result in a transformative
experience (Paul 2014, 2015).29 Chang (2015) argues that, in some cases,
the choice itself might be transformative. In either case, we sometimes face
decisions that have the power to fundamentally alter the kind of person we
will become.
The decision to fight Nazis or stay with Mom is, in some sense, a
decision that’s also about what kind of person to become. It’s potentially
transformative. And—I claim—if what you decide will partially constitute
your rational identity, or change the kind of person you will become, or
involves acting on your deeply-held values (as opposed to mere preferences),
we’re prone to be more forgiving. This is because transformative decisions
usually involve a switch in the “audience” to whom you’re interested in
projecting a flattering autobiographical narrative. Furthermore, if the kind
of transformation brought about by your decision is radical enough—in
particular, if it involves a change in your underlying core values—you have
reason to repudiate your past behavior, and thus lack a compelling reason
to integrate into your autobiography going forward.30 So the fact that one
of your available actions can be better integrated into a unifying narrative
should matter little to you. (In fact, depending on who you’re choosing to
become, the fact that one of your possible actions can be better integrated
into a unifying narrative might amount to a point against performing that
29 Paul (2014, 2015) argues that a transformative experience can be epistemically transfor-
mative, personally transformative, or both. An experience is epistemically transformative if
the only way to know what it’s like to have it is to have it. Seeing the color red for the first
time would be epistemically transformative. An experience is personally transformative if
having it would significantly and fundamentally change what you care about. Paul’s central
example—becoming a new parent—is an example of both. The distinction doesn’t matter
much for our purposes, but I will be focusing more heavily on the personally transformative
aspects of these decisions (see also Ullmann-Margalit 2006, 2007).
30 Another popular example of this phenomenon is Parfit’s Russian Nobleman, who intends
to give his land to the peasants but anticipates that his socialist ideals will fade with age (Parfit
1984, 327–329). It’s natural to think of the Russian Nobleman as essentially two different
people. When you face a transformative decision, you have to decide who you are to become,
and you might decide to become a different person than who you are now.
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action.) You still desire to spin a flattering self-narrative, of course, but
it should be a story about your new self; the story of who you were has
ended.
So here are three important differences between the two cases—a differ-
ence in stakes, a difference in duration between decisions, and a difference
in the transformative power of the decisions—all of which contribute, in
their own ways and in varying degrees, to our inclination to be more
forgiving about some cases of diachronic misfortune than others.
6 Does the Explanation Show Too Little?
Here’s another potential problem. Imagine an agent who doesn’t have any-
thing even resembling a desire to maintain plausible deniability about hav-
ing suffered diachronic misfortune: an asocial alien, for example. Doesn’t
it also seem irrational for this agent to place the $50 voucher in box B
and then take box A? But, given that this agent doesn’t care about spin-
ning a flattering social story, it needn’t have done anything instrumentally
irrational.
That’s true, but I think we have reason to be suspicious of our intu-
itions in these cases, and that the view I’ve sketched can vindicate this
suspicion. Let me briefly recapitulate the dialectic. There are cases like
Generous Game Show in which certain sequences of actions strike us as
irrational. On the one hand, my proposal aims to vindicate those intu-
itions: typically, you have done something irrational if you perform such a
sequence. On the other hand, my proposal aims to provide an error-theory:
despite appearances, you’ve done nothing diachronically irrational. My
proposal ascribes to us a standing, non-instrumental desire—the desire to
spin flattering yet plausible self-narratives—which, unless outweighed by
other considerations, will typically render one of the actions in the sequence
synchronically irrational. The reason that it might seem like there are
fundamental diachronic norms of rationality is that typically when it seems
like such a norm has been violated, some particular synchronic norm has
been. In the case of the asocial alien things are not so simple. Proponents
of Time-Slice Rationality should say that the asocial alien, despite our
intuitions to the contrary, has not behaved irrationally in any sense. The
asocial alien, by hypothesis, has no standing desire to spin a flattering yet
plausible self-narrative, and so needn’t have violated a synchronic norm by
performing the offending sequence.
However, I think we have reason to be suspicious of the intuition that
the asocial alien has behaved irrationally, diachronically or synchronically.
Here’s why. Much like the desire to tell flattering stories about ourselves,
our intuitions about rationality themselves have been forged on the anvil of
social interaction. And because this desire is central to our self-identities
and central to our ability to get along with each other, it’s not implausible
to think that we project this desire onto others. We can, of course, imagine
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asocial agents (and we can stipulate that the protagonists of our thought
experiments, e.g., only care about money), but our intuitions about ratio-
nality might have trouble being sensitive to these features. In general, the
farther away a hypothetical case is from the domain in which our intuitions
have been trained, the less we should trust those intuitions.
As it stands, however, this response isn’t entirely satisfying. Even if
the desire to tell flattering stories about ourselves has been planted deeply
inside of us via some evolutionary process, it doesn’t follow that we’ll
have trouble imagining hypothetical agents lacking this desire in a way
that will be difficult for our intuitions about rationality to reliably track.
Offhand, we seem to encounter no such difficulties with other desires that
have a similar psychological status and etiology. Our desire for sweets,
for example, might be evolutionarily hard-wired, and yet adopting a strict
no-sweets diet doesn’t typically strike us as irrational. Nor do we typically
judge the celibate monk as behaving irrationally in virtue of being celibate.
I think the desire to spin a flattering self-narrative is importantly different
in two respects. First, the underlying reasons that explain why we’ve
internalized such a desire are still operative in many cases. In other words,
there are still in many cases instrumental reasons to want to present oneself
in a flattering light. We continue to be social creatures who must coordinate
with each other in order to accomplish our other goals, whatever those other
goals happen to be. Whatever your goals are, it will often be in your interest
to spin a flattering yet plausible self-narrative. But that’s not true of the
desire for sweets or sex. Those desires are, generally, no longer instrumental
in satisfying your other goals whatever they might be. If, however, they
were instrumental in satisfying your other goals, it’s no longer obvious that
it wouldn’t be irrational to not desire them. For example, if you’re trapped
in a candy store (with no hope of escape), sticking to your no-sweets diet
would be irrational. We are, as it were, trapped in a social world (with no
hope of escape). And so we have instrumental reason to care about our
self-narratives.31
The second difference is related to the first, but more significant. Our
practice of rationally evaluating each other’s behavior is itself inseparably
bound up with our desire to get along with each other. Evaluating some-
one’s behavior as rational or irrational is part of the larger social practice of
collectively settling on norms that aid in solving coordination problems.32
31 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
32 Gibbard (1990) develops a view very similar to the one I have in mind: the function
of rational evaluations is to promote coordination in action and feelings. A similar idea
concerning epistemic rationality can be found in Dogramaci 2012, 2015. Dogramaci (2012)
argues that “the simple use [of epistemically evaluative assertions] promotes the coordination
of epistemic rule-following across the linguistic community” (522) which can help “extend
our common epistemic reach by enabling each person to serve as an ‘epistemic surrogate’ of
any other person” (524). A similar idea concerning knowledge can be found in Craig 1990.
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The idea is that rational evaluations—using words like ‘rational’ or ‘irra-
tional’ to describe someone’s behavior—are partly expressive. I judge you
to be instrumentally irrational insofar as your behavior deviates from the
predictions of my folk psychological theory and I express disapproval. This
is consistent with understanding instrumental rationality to be about taking
the best means to one’s ends. If I judge you to be instrumentally irrational,
I don’t think you’ve taken the best means to your ends. I can only make
such a judgment if I have some idea of what your ends are. In real-life cases,
my beliefs about your ends come from constructing a folk psychological
theory based on (somewhat meager) evidence about your past behavior. My
folk psychological theory issues predictions about how you’ll behave in the
future. If your future behavior defies these predictions, I must either revise
my theory or judge that you’ve behaved irrationally on this occasion.33
One function of doing the latter, I conjecture, is to exert pressure on you to
bring your future behavior into line with our expectations.
Our intuitions about the rationality of someone’s diachronic behavior,
then, might not merely track whether her behavior is sensible from her
perspective, but also the extent to which it would be easy to predict her
behavior. When we imagine the asocial alien, perhaps we can’t help but
imaginatively treat her as a member of our rational community. The asocial
alien might not care about her self-narrative. But were she a member of our
community, we’d exert pressure on her to construct one. We’d interact with
her in ways to make her care. Given that one way to exert such pressure is
with the use of words like ‘rational’ and ‘irrational,’ it’s not unreasonable
to expect our intuitions about the rationality of the asocial alien’s behavior
to track whether we’d be disposed to call it ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ were
she a member of our community. If this is so, we have some reason to be
cautious about the reliability of our intuitions in these sorts of cases.
7 Conclusion
The argument in this paper goes like this. Because we are social creatures,
there is rational pressure on us to signal that we have those qualities that
would make one a good teammate. It serves our basic ends to work
together, to build communities, and to be part of a team. In order to work
together on teams, we need to signal that we would make good teammates.
Through a process of social evolution, we have come to internalize the
desire to act in ways that can be (easily and plausibly) integrated into an
autobiographical narrative that represents us in a flattering light. We want,
33 This is very different from other cases of theorizing. If my theory of planetary motion, for
example, makes a false prediction, I have reason to revise my theory. That might make me
sad. But I wouldn’t express disapproval toward the behavior of the planets. The difference is
that, in this case, my expression of disapproval would (of course) have no influence on the
future behavior of the planets. But folk psychology is different. In folk psychology, theorists
and subjects interact in ways that mutually influence each other (McGeer 2001, 2007, 2015).
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that is, to construct a narrative according to which we look like the kind of
person with whom others would want on their team.
The desire to present a flattering self-narrative involves wanting to
act in ways that will allow us to maintain plausible deniability about
either having made an unwise decision at some point, or having unstable
preferences. Why is that? People who make unwise decisions don’t make
ideal teammates. We want to collaborate with others who assess their
evidence sensibly, proportion their beliefs to their evidence, and act sensibly
in light of these beliefs. Moreover, people with unstable preferences don’t
make ideal teammates either. We want to collaborate with people whose
behavior is (more or less) easy to predict, people who make it relatively easy
to read-off their desires from their choice-behavior, etc. We’re particularly
weary of revealing that we’ve made an unwise decision that turned on the
stability of our own preferences.
When you suffer diachronic misfortune, either you’ve made a prediction
that turned out to be false or your preferences have changed. So, if you
don’t want to make salient the possibility that you’ve made an irrational
prediction or that your preferences are unstable, you have reason to main-
tain plausible deniability about having suffered diachronic misfortune—at
least in cases in which suffering misfortune is likely to suggest these things.
I’ve argued that our deeply rooted standing desire to spin flattering yet
plausible self-narratives about our diachronic behavior helps explain why
certain sequences of actions in certain circumstances strikes us as irrational.
The cases in which we are inclined to think that a diachronic requirement
of rationality has been violated are also those cases in which, given that
the agent in question has such a desire, she will have fallen afoul of the
purely synchronic rational requirement to take the means that best promote
her ends. Our nature as social agents has endowed us with a need for
diachronic stability. In this way, our concern for our autobiographies
simulates diachronic norms.
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